Practical Queries for Malware Infrastructure - Part 3 (Advanced Examples)

More interesting and practical queries for identifying malware infrastructure.

Practical and real-world examples of queries for identifying malware infrastructure. The primary tooling used is Censys.io.

Redline Stealer
Qakbot
NJRat
Remcos
BianLian Go Trojan
XTreme RAT
SuperShell Botnet

Qakbot Command and Control Servers

Censys Link

Empty Banner Produces Unique Hash
Particular Structure to TLS certificates
Qakbot server typically on port 443,993 or 995
Server name all lower case letters with no subdomain
No identified operating system on servers
Same ja3s across malicious servers.

services:(banner_hashes="sha256:e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855" and tls.certificates.leaf_data.subject_dn:/C=[^,]+, OU=[^,]+, CN=[^,]+/ and tls.certificates.leaf_data.issuer_dn:/C=[^,]+, ST=[^,]+, L=[^,]+, O=[^,]+, CN=[^,]+/ and (port:443 or port:993 or port:995)) and services.tls.certificates.leaf_data.names:/[a-z]{3,15}.[a-z]{2,5}/ and not operating_system.product:* and services.tls.ja3s: 475c9302dc42b2751db9edcac3b74891

BianLian GO Trojan

Censys Link

Empty Banner on Main Service
Very particular structure to certificate names (both Issuer and Subject) eg C=zHNWYSaBumxjPKPY, O=KcUnN1CdTgEOxr6h, OU=FtVXN2EyNbwlXUP8
Service always unidentifed, presumably due to lack of headers.

services:(banner_hashes="sha256:e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855" and tls.certificates.leaf_data.subject_dn=/C=[^,]{10,20}, O=[^,]{10,20}, OU=[^,]{10,20}/ and tls.certificates.leaf_data.issuer_dn=/C=[^,]{10,20}, O=[^,]{10,20}, OU=[^,]{10,20}/ and service_name:UNKNOWN)

NJRat/Xworm Botnet Servers

Censys Link

Extremely high number of running services (typically 200-400)
At least one dns.name pointing to an ngrok address
Most ports running GStreamer Service

service_count:[200 to 2000] and dns.names:ngrok and services.banner:GStreamer

Redline Stealer C2

Censys Link

Initial Redline stealer c2 on 77.91.124[.]86:19084
Running 3 services, DNS and 2 Valve Related services.
Reverse DNS pointing to a Russian VPN Service
Searching on DNS Forwarding + .ru dns + Valve Service + 3 total services results in 18 servers with 3 marked as known malware.
Other 15 results are "clean", but may be reserved for later malicious use.

services.dns.server_type="FORWARDING" and dns.reverse_dns.names:*.ru and services.extended_service_name="VALVE" and service_count:3

Remcos C2 Servers, Overlap with other RAT Families

Censys Link

Empty Banner Produces Unique-ish hash value
Same Jarm fingerprint across services
Same Ja3s
Almost always on port 2404

services:(banner_hashes="sha256:e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855" and jarm.fingerprint="00000000000000000041d41d0000001798d6156df422564fb9b667b7418e4c" and port:2404 and tls.ja3s: eb1d94daa7e0344597e756a1fb6e7054)